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community, and nearly all fiscal control of local programs by local 
governments would be destroyed. 
CONCLUSION 
While the existence of inequities in the property tax system is 
granted, these inequities do not create an infringement of any 
constitutional rights, for as the Court has stated: 
To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its 
invalidity. It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from 
judicial interference. The problems of government are practical 
ones. .. Mere errors of government are not subject to our 
judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which 
can be declared void under the fourteenth amendment.2 0 
Therefore, the Rodriguez decision disallowing property taxation for 
public school financing may well be reversed for three reasons: (1) the 
requirement of an invidious discriminatory state action is absent herein, 
(2) the burden of proving damage has not been met, as recent studies 
question the assumption that equal educational opportunity is a 
function of increased spending, and (3) only federal socialized 
education would eliminate the present inequalities at the exorbitant 
cost of taking control of the schools away from the local parents. 
S.H.O. 
CRIMINAL LAW-THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE IN MARYLAND--
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF PREMISES AND SEIZURE OF 
EVIDENCE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. BROWN V. STATE, 15 
Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972). 
In Brown v. State, 1 officers investigating a series of burglaries 
questioned a suspect in the street. The officers requested and were 
denied permission to search his residence. The officers then proceeded 
to the suspect's residence, a rented room in a house belonging to a Mrs. 
Hall, ostensibly for the purpose of obtaining a description of the place 
to be used in the search warrant. The investigators identified themselves 
and were invited in by Mrs. Hall. From the hallway outside of the 
suspect's room, they observed through the already open door a box 
containing articles easily identifiable as part of the stolen goods from 
the burglaries under investigation. One of the officers reached into the 
room, without actually stepping into it, and seized the box. 
20. Metropolis 'Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913). 
1. 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972). 
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The court held that the seizure violated the fourth amendment and 
pointed out that while Mrs. Hall could and did give consent to the entry 
of the officers into her home, the "open view" of the box from the 
hallway did not automatically bring into effect the Plain View 
Doctrine. The Supreme Court of the United States has defined this 
doctrine in Harris v. United States,2 where the court said: 
It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view 
of an officer who has a right to be in position to have that view 
are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence. 
(emphasis added).3 
However, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire,4 any evidence seized by police will, at least at the instant of 
seizure, be in open view. The Brown court, therefore, placed great 
emphasis on the question whether the police officers had a legal right to 
be in position to observe the evidence that was seized: 
The threshold, therefore, that concerns us here-in measuring 
whether there was or was not a prior valid intrusion-is the 
threshold to the appellant's room, not the threshold to Mrs. 
Hall's house. In this case, the relevant threshold had not been 
crossed, and without a warrant it could not be crossed.s 
The first major problem that the Brown court had to decide was in 
which circumstances the Plain View Doctrine would come into effect. 
The court set forth two conditions that must be present to justify a 
"plain view" seizure. The first was that there must be a prior valid 
intrusion for an officer to be in position to have the view.6 The second 
was that such a view must be inadvertent, that is, not planned in any 
way.7 
2. 390 U.S. 234 (1968). 
3, [d. at 236. 
4. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
5. 15 Md. App. at 612, 292 A.2d at 778. 
6. The court in Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. at 603, 292 A.2d at 733, gave four situations, 
by way of example-not limitation-which may justify the first condition, a prior valid 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area; these are: 
a. A search incident to a lawful arrest inside a constitutionally protected area. Mar-
ron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
b. Exigent circumstances that are present and known to the officer prior to the intru-
sion. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 397 U.S. 294 (1967); cf. Fellows v. State, 
13 Md. App. 206, 283 A.2d 1 (1971). 
c. A valid presence inside a constitutionally protected area for some legitimate purpose 
other than a planned search for evidence against the accused. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 
731 (1969). 
d. A warranted search of a given area for specified objects, in the course of which some 
other article of incriminating character is found by the searchers. See Marron v. United 
States, supra. 
7. 15 Md. App. at 603, 292 A.2d at 773. 
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These conditions to bring into effect the Plain View Doctrine were 
derived from Coolidge;8 however, recognizing their presence is not as 
simple as it might appear. Nowhere in Coolidge did the plurality of the 
Supreme Court Justices define the degree of inadvertency required to 
validate a discovery of evidence by a police officer. If an officer has the 
probable cause to secure a search warrant, he would logically have no 
legitimate reason for not listing the object that he expects to find in the 
search on the warrant.9 
Thus, the second major problem in applying the Plain View Doctrine 
is for a court to define the inadvertency requirement in such a fashion 
as to enable the police to function according to prescribed rules.' 0 
Without such a definition of the requirement of inadvertency, police 
behavior would no doubt lack uniformity in regard to the seizure of 
evidence. Such a result might conceivably have an effect on the lower 
criminal courts, in time-consuming motions to suppress evidence. 
In considering this second problem, one authority has concluded that 
a possible approach is for courts to insist on strict compliance with the 
requirement that police action leading to a plain view is in no way 
planned or predetermined." Such an interpretation would eliminate 
the problem at the source-in the police investigation, which would in 
turn become narrower in scope. 
In Brown, the inadvertency requirement of Coolidge was interpreted 
to forbid "the planned warrantless seizure." By this the court meant: 
There may not be a contrived investigatory reconnaissance 
aimed at evading the warrant requirement for a search or 
seizure. There may not be a planned "Plain View.'" 2 
The court indicated its desire to enforce a strict compliance with this 
condition to bring into effect the Plain View Doctrine.' 3 In light of 
this position, the doctrine is likely to become less used but more useful 
in the future than it has been in the past. 
In historical perspective, the Plain View Doctrine is the newest in a 
developing line of exceptions to the fundamental proposition that 
" ... searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
fourth amendment .... ,,' 4 Before its emergence as an independent 
doctrine in Coolidge, Plain View was applied as part of the exception to 
8. [d. at 602,292 A.2d at 772. 
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 551 (1971); Frey v. State. 3 Md. App. 38, 237 A.2d 774 (1967); 
Hau v. State, 232 Md. 588, 194 A.2d 801 (1963). 
10. The Attorney General of Maryland issues guidelines for the Police Department to follow. 
For example, see 55 OP. A'IT'y GEN. 313 (Md. 1971), for guidelines concerning the scope 
of search incident to arrest, as set forth by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
11. Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 244-46 (1972). 
12. 15 Md. App. at 609, 292 A.2d at 776. 
13. [d. at 608 n. 39, 292 A.2d at 776 n. 39. 
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
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the necessity for a search warrant during searches incident to a lawful 
arrest. 1 5 
Historically, the permissible range of search connected with a valid 
arrest has not been constant. 1 6 In the periods of broad scope the 
Supreme Court has allowed seizure of items in plain view within the 
room or house in which the suspect had been arrested. 1 7 The current 
scope of search incident to a lawful arrest, in the course of which a 
plain view seizure may be made, was set forth in Chimel v. 
California: 1 8 
... a search of the arrestee's person and the area within his 
immediate control-construing that phrase to mean the area 
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or 
destructible evidence. 
Under the present limitations on a search incident to a valid arrest, 
even in light of Chimel, an officer can still seize contraband in plain 
view. 1 9 But due to the narrow scope of search suggested by the Chimel 
Court, the Plain View Doctrine as applied to evidence observed in the 
course of a constitutional search already in progress, or in the course of 
an otherwise justifiable intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, 
has become independent from the doctrine that was formerly 
applicable only during a search incident to a valid arrest:20 
The Brown decision, in setting forth the criteria of the Court of 
Special Appeals, indicates Maryland's position on the Plain View 
Doctrine. By requiring a strict compliance with the condition that 
sighting of evidence be inadvertent, Maryland has adopted a position 
that appears to be in accord with the majority of courts dealing with 
the doctrine since Coolidge. 2 1 
15. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1946). 
16. The following is a chart showing broad and narrow ranges of search incident to an arrest, 
as decided by the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Periods of broad scope of search: 
1927-31 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
1947-48 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
1950-69 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
Periods of search with riarrow scope: 
1931-47 Go·Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
1948-50 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). 
1969-present Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
17. In cases such as these, the plain view was brought about by a search of the premises 
incident to arrest; sometimes an entire house was searched, as indicated in Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) 
(search of an apartment). 
18. 395 U.S. at 763. 
19. See Himmel v. State, 9 Md. App. 395, 264 A.2d 874 (1970). 
20. Scales v. State, 13 Md. App. 474, 478 n. 1, 284 A.2d 45, 47 n. 1 (1971). 
21. United States v. Perry, 339 F.Supp. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1972); People v. Dickerson, 23 Cal. 
App. 3d 721, 100 Cal. Rptr. 553 (2d Dist. 1972); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 51 (Wyo. 
1972); Comm. v. HaefeIL~ass.~79 N.E.2d 915 (1972); State v. Ruiz, 17 Ariz. 
App. 76, 495 P.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1972). 
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Thus far in the current year, only two reported decisions can be 
placed in the "minority," that is, in a group of courts which appear not 
to require a strict compliance with the condition that observation of 
evidence prior to seizure be inadvertent. The first of these, Blincoe v. 
People,22 was decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In this case 
the facts indicate that an officer failed to find any occupants in a 
dwelling where he was present for the purpose of making inquiry about 
certain stolen property. The officer searched the curtilege (upon prior 
information) and found the defendant in hiding. The Colorado court 
held that the seizure of stolen goods on the premises was valid, as the 
evidence was in "plain view." The court found that the hidden 
defendant created an "emergency" which justified the prior intrusion 
needed to activate the Plain View Doctrine. 
The Blincoe court misconstrues both conditions needed to apply the 
Plain View Doctrine. The hidden defendant did not bring about any 
recognized exception23 to the requirement that a search warrant is 
needed before an intrusion can be made into a constitutionally 
protected area. Going to a premises upon receiving prior information 
that stolen goods are located therein does not bring about a view that is 
unplanned. Thus, the officer in Blincoe made an unlawful intrusion into 
a constitutionally protected area that could give him no "plain view" of 
evidence. 
The second decision that appears to be in the minority (if not in 
error) is State v. Alexander, 2 4 from the Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
The facts in Alexander indicate that an undercover agent dressed in 
youthful appearing clothes was given consent to enter the defendant's 
premises. This agent in turn admitted uniformed officers who made a 
plain view seizure of marijuana. The Oregon court held that the view 
was not planned; however, the undercover agent was highly trained in 
the detection of narcotics. Such a holding clearly violates the spirit, if 
not the mandate, of Coolidge. Although the Alexander court appeared 
to be aware of the two preconditions for a plain view seizure, it 
stretched the inadvertency condition far beyond reasonable limits. 
In contrast, recent decisions supporting the majority rule have given 
careful consideration to the inadvertence aspect of a plain view seizure, 
as did the Brown court. In Lonquest v. State,2 5 a Wyoming court 
applied the Plain View Doctrine to the seizure of a shotgun and 
cartridges. When officers responded to a call in that case, they entered 
the defendant's premises and found his wife's body on the floor. As the 
officers did not know if the defendant (who was in a dazed condition) 
22. _ Colo. ~ 494 P.2d 1285 (1972). 
23. The Blincoe court mentions that the officer was given consent to enter the premises (a 
recognized exception to justify a prior intrusion), but the court does not use this fact in 
its rationale when considering the Plain View Doctrine. 
24. _ Or. App. ~ 495 P.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1972). 
25. 495 P.2d 575 (Wyo. 1972). . 
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or some felon perhaps still present committed the deed, they looked 
through the rooms in the house. Behind a door in the bedroom they 
observed the shotgun; the shells were in plain view on a table near the 
body. The court in Lonquest pointed out that an emergency existed 
which justified the prior intrusion, and that the investigation of a 
homicide that had just taken place established the required conditions 
for making an entry into a constitutionally protected area, thus 
allowing a valid "plain view" of the evidence. 
A California court in People u. Dickerson26 was consistent with the 
majority of courts when it held that the seizure of a baseball bat that 
was observed leaning against the side of a building was lawful, since no 
threshold was crossed to obtain the view. Such a seizure did not involve 
the entry into a constitutionally protected area, unlike the crossing of 
the "threshold" of the defendant's room in Brown. 
By adopting a position of strict compliance with the inadvertency 
condition, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Brown has placed 
itself squarely within the majority of jurisdictions in regard to the Plain 
View Doctrine. Although this position might in the immediate future 
cause the State to lose some evidence obtained in police investigations, 
as in Brown, this position will in the long run avoid wasteful 
suppression hearings and endless appeals. 
Thus, the court in Brown has taken a sound approach to a difficult 
problem. By requiring that the sighting of all evidence seized under the 
Plain View Doctrine be inadvertent, the court will minimize problems 
usually associated with such seizures. The guidelines set by this court 
will give law enforcement officials an opportunity to refine their 
evidence-gathering techniques until they conform to the most recent 
position of the Supreme Court. By virtue of this decision, Maryland has 
taken a forward-looking position on a most complicated area of law. 
F.S.L. 
26. 23 Cal. App. 3d 721, 100 Cal. Rptr. 533 (2d Dist. 1972). 
